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Comment
EXTRATERRITORIAL DISCOVERY UNDER THE HAGUE
EVIDENCE CONVENTION
INTRODUCTION
Few issues have engendered more friction in the international legal
community than the extension of the United States legal system beyond
its borders during pretrial discovery.1 By ordering parties to produce
evidence located abroad, United States courts extend their powers be-
yond national boundaries and come into conflict with the sovereignty of
other states. As the number of international commercial transactions
has risen, transnational litigation has increased, and the conflict over
foreign discovery has intensified. 2
Many foreign States are hostile toward United States practice per-
mitting American courts to order pretrial discovery within their terri-
tory.3 There are many reasons cited for the hostility, not the least of
which is that most States view unilateral extraterritorial discovery as a
violation of international law.4 In addition, the liberal pretrial discovery
procedures used in the United States are alien to civil law countries. 5
Adding to the conflict, there are other fundamental differences between
civil law and common law legal systems regarding the function of the
court in the gathering of evidence. 6 Thus, in what they perceive as a
1. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (RE-
VISED) § 437 reporter's note 1 (Tent. Draft No. 6 1985) [hereinafter cited as
RESTATEMENT (REVISED)].
2. See Note, The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and
Commercial Matters-A Comparison with the Federal Rules, 7 BROOKLYNJ. INT'L L. 365
(1981); Note, Taking Evidence Outside the United States, 55 B.U.L. REV. 368, 368
(1975).
3. Onkelinx, Conflict of InternationalJurisdiction: Ordering the Production of Docu-
ments in Violation of the Law of the Situs, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 487, 495 (1969); Rosen-
thal & Yale-Loehr, Two Cheers for the ALl Restatement's Provisions on Foreign
Discovery, 16 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1075, 1075 (1984). For a discussion of
the rules of international law governing the jurisdiction of States, see infra notes
32-68 and accompanying text.
4. See Rosenthal & Yale-Loehr, supra note 3, at 1079.
5. PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, EXTRATERRITORIAL DISCOVERY IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LITIGATION 23 (1984) [hereinafter cited as EXTRATERRITORIAL DIsCOv-
ERY]. For a comparison of the common law and civil law approaches to
discovery, see infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
6. Many States object to liberal American discovery rules that permit, in
their view, "'fishing' proceeding[s]." Radio Corporation of America v. Rauland
Corporation, [1956] 1 Q.B. 618, 649 (C.A.). See also In re Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. Uranium Contract Litig., reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 38, 39-40
(1978). The problem is more acute when substantive law and policy differences
(253)
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necessary step to protect their sovereign interests, 7 some of these States
have adopted legislation designed to block efforts of United States liti-
gants to obtain evidence within their territory.8
The Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and
Commercial Matters (Hague Evidence Convention) 9 is a multilateral
treaty designed to resolve the jurisdictional conflict inherent in foreign
discovery by establishing "minimum standards"' 0 for "judicial assist-
exist between the two countries. Discovery has been most ardently opposed
when the litigation involved the application of United States antitrust laws. See,
e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Addressed to Canadian Int'l Paper
Co., 72 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) (case resulting in passage of Canadian
blocking statute); In re Investigation of World Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 280
(D.D.C. 1952).
7. Beckett, United Kingdom, Transnational Litigation-Part II Perspectives From
the U.S. and Abroad, 18 INT'L LAW. 773, 776 (1984) (commentator from United
Kingdom stating, "We see our legislation as a legitimate and pragmatic response
to a situation which has been developing over many years and which has recently
become more acute.").
One author notes that United States courts order depositions of persons "in
Geneva, Switzerland as if they were in Geneva, New York, and the inspection
and production of documents ... located in Hanover, West Germany as if they
were in Hanover, New Hampshire." Oxman, The Choice Between Direct Discovery
and Other Means of Obtaining Evidence Abroad: The Impact of the Hague Evidence Con-
vention, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 733, 742 (1983).
8. As of 1982, 15 States had adopted "blocking statutes" imposing civil or
criminal penalties for the removal of evidence from the country. Some of these
statutes prohibit disclosure in connection with specific subject matters. See, e.g.,
Uranium Information Security Regulations, CAN. STAT. 0. & REGIs. 544 (1976)
(cited in Batista, Confronting Foreign "Blocking" Legislation: A Guide to Securing Dis-
closure from Non-resident Parties to American Litigation, 17 INT'L LAw. 61, 62 n. 1
(1983) (Canada enacted statute in response to United States federal grand jury
investigation of alleged uranium cartel)). Other blocking statutes prohibit dis-
closure that is not in compliance with local procedures or international treaties.
See, e.g., Batista, supra, at 62 (citing French, Australian, and United Kingdom
blocking statutes); Carter, Existing Rules and Procedures, 13 INT'L LAw. 5, 7 n.2
(1979) (citing blocking statutes of the Netherlands and Province of Ontario).
9. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S. 231
[hereinafter cited as Hague Evidence Convention].
Prior to the drafting of the Hague Evidence Convention, the United States
became a party to the Hague Service Convention. See Convention on the Service
Abroad ofJudicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters,
Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638, 658 U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter
cited as Hague Service Convention]. The Hague Service Convention was a revi-
sion of chapter I of the Civil Procedure Convention of 1954, which had super-
seded the Civil Procedure Convention of 1905. See Comment, The Hague
Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters: The Exclu-
sive and Mandatory Procedures for Discovery Abroad, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1461, 1463
n.5 (1984). The United States was not a party to either the 1905 or 1954 Civil
Procedure Conventions. Id. The Hague Evidence Convention revised chapter I
of the 1954 Civil Procedure Convention. Id.
10. Report of the United States Delegation to the Eleventh Session of the Hague Con-
ference on Private International Law, reprinted in 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 785, 808
(1969) (emphasis omitted) [hereinafter cited as Report of the U.S. Delegation]. For
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ance"' I that are "tolerable" to the State where the evidence is taken,
and that produce evidence that is "utilizable" in the forum State.12 The
Hague Evidence Convention codifies the minimum procedural and sub-
stantive aspects of judicial assistance,13 and preserves any more liberal
procedures in the internal law of signatory States.14 Certain provisions
are subject to restrictions by the State executing the request for judicial
assistance, but a State may refuse a proper request only in certain nar-
row circumstances. 15 In 1972, after receiving the advice and consent of
the United States Senate, 16 the United States became one of the first
States to ratify the Convention. 17 The Hague Evidence Convention is
currently in force between the United States and sixteen other
countries. 18
Although the Hague Evidence Convention has been in force in the
United States for over a decade, it was not until the early 1980's, at
which point a significant number of other States had ratified the Con-
vention, that it became a major factor in transnational litigation brought
in United States courts.19 Since that time, there has been a dramatic
a discussion of the procedure used to gather evidence under the Hague Evi-
dence Convention, see infra notes 86-116 and accompanying text.
11. International judicial assistance has been defined as "aid rendered by
one nation to another in support of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings in the
recipient country's tribunals." Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural
Chaos and a Program for Reform, 62 YALE L.J. 515, 515 (1953).
Except for incidental provisions concerning the service of documents con-
tained in consular treaties, no treaty provision for judicial assistance appeared
until well into the 19th century; and the United States was not a party to any
judicial assistance treaty until well into the 20th century. Harvard Research in
International Law, Draft Convention on Judicial Assistance, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 26-
29 (Supp. 1939).
12. See Report of the U.S. Delegation, supra note 10, at 806; Explanatory Report on
the Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, reprinted
in 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 327, 327 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Explanatory
Report].
13. For a discussion of the procedural and substantive aspects of the Hague
Evidence Convention with respect to judicial assistance, see infra notes 79-116
and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the ways in which the Hague Evidence Convention
acts to preserve more liberal procedures of contracting States, see infra notes
112-16 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the circumstances in which a State may refuse a
proper request for judicial assistance, see infra notes 103-07 and accompanying
text.
16. S Res. 205, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CONG. REC. 520,623 (1972). The
Senate's advice and consent to the treaty was given without dissent. Id.
17. Ristau, Overview of InternationalJudicial Assistance, 18 INT'L LAW. 525, 528-
29 (1984).
18. Barbados, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal
Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portu-
gal, Singapore, Sweden, and the United Kingdom have ratified the Convention.
7 MARTINDALE-HUBBEL L. DIRECTORY pt. 7, at 14-15 (1986).
19. See Comment, supra note 9, at 1470.
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increase in the number of cases in which litigants have asserted that the
discovery of evidence located in a foreign contracting State must pro-
ceed in accordance with the Hague Evidence Convention. 20 The issue
presented to the courts is whether the Evidence Convention or the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure govern the discovery of evidence located
within the territory of a contracting State. 2 1 Uncertain of the proper
scope of the Evidence Convention, United States federal and state
courts have taken divergent positions on this issue. 22
Some courts have required exclusive use of Evidence Convention
procedures 23 while others have held that use of these procedures is op-
tional even for physical inspections and depositions within the territory
of a signatory State.2 4 A third view, which is perhaps the most preva-
lent, is that as a matter of comity25 courts must require the party seeking
discovery to utilize the procedures of the Hague Evidence Convention
before resorting to discovery under the Federal Rules. 2 6 In 1984, this
issue was appealed to the United States Supreme Court in two cases:
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Falzon2 7 and Club Meditteranee, S.A. v.
20. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari to United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit at 7-8, In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1985)
(stating that this discovery issue was raised in nine reported cases in 1983, in at
least 12 cases in 1984, and in at least six cases in early 1985). The number of
reported cases does not accurately reflect the frequency with which this issue
arises because appeals of discovery orders often are not reported or are settled
out of court. See Note, Gathering Evidence Abroad: The Hague Evidence Convention
Revisited, 16 LAw & POL. INT'L Bus. 963, 964 (1984).
21. See, e.g., Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 517-24 (N.D. Ill.
1984). The claim that the Hague Evidence Convention controls is often coupled
with the assertion of a foreign blocking statute as a defense to the requested
discovery. See, e.g., id. at 508-12.
22. For a discussion of the decisions of United States courts analyzing the
scope of the Hague Evidence Convention, see infra notes 117-211 and accompa-
nying text.
23. See, e.g., Cuisinarts, Inc. v. Robot-Coupe, S.A., No. CV-80-00500083
(Conn. Super. Ct.July 22, 1982). The Cuisinarts court held that under article VI,
clause 2, of the Constitution the Hague Evidence Convention "represents the
sole avenue open to an American party wishing to obtain evidence in one of the
contracting states." Id. slip op. at 5.
24. See, e.g., In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1985). For a
discussion of In re Anschuetz, see infra notes 187-200 and accompanying text.
25. Comity has been defined as "[t]he concept that the courts of one sover-
eign state should not, as a matter of sound international relations, require acts
or forbearances within the territory, and inconsistent with the internal laws, of
another sovereign state unless careful weighing of competing interests and alter-
native means makes clear that the order is justified." Volkswagenwerk Aktien-
gesellschaft v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 840, 857, 176 Cal. Rptr. 874,
880 (1981). For a discussion of Volkswagenwerk, see infra notes 145-53 and ac-
companying text.
26. See, e.g., Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D.
58 (E.D. Pa. 1983). For a discussion of Philadelphia Gear, see infra notes 125-32
and accompanying text.
27. Falzon v. Volkswagen Mfg. Corp., 417 Mich. 889 (1983), appeal dismissed
sub nom. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Falzon, 465 U.S. 1014 (1984).
256
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Dorin.28 Although the Court did not reach the merits of either case, the
Department of Justice filed briefs amicus curiae expressing the views of
the United States in both cases. 29 Unfortunately, the Department of
Justice expressed inconsistent views in the two cases, leading to greater
confusion and uncertainty in the area of foreign discovery. Two certio-
rari petitions recently have been filed requesting review of Fifth Circuit
decisions holding that parties seeking evidence located within a signa-
tory State are not required to use the Hague Evidence Convention
procedures.3 0
Commentators have analyzed the Evidence Convention under prin-
ciples of treaty interpretation and constitutional law, concluding that as
a treaty obligation of the United States, the Convention is binding on
United States courts.3 1 The remaining issue to be resolved is the proper
scope of the Convention. This comment analyzes the Convention in the
context of the jurisdictional conflicts it is designed to resolve. Part I
discusses international legal principles governing the jurisdiction of
States. Part II discusses the purpose of the Hague Evidence Convention
and describes its key provisions. The decisions of United States courts
that have analyzed the role of the Convention in United States litigation
are discussed in Part III. Following an analysis under international prin-
ciples of jurisdiction, the comment asserts that the scope of the obliga-
tions under the Convention will vary based on the restrictions placed by
each contracting State on discovery activity within their territory. The
comment further concludes that an interpretation that the Hague Evi-
dence Convention exclusively controls extraterritorial discovery is in the
best interest of the United States, and thus urges the United States
Supreme Court to reaffirm the obligations of the United States under
the Convention.
I. CONFLICTS OF JURISDICTION
The power of a court to order the production of evidence located
abroad pursuant to the rules of the forum depends initially on the juris-
28. Dorin v. Club Mediterranee, S.A., 93 A.D.2d 1007, 462 N.Y.S.2d 524
(1983), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 105 S. Ct. 286 (1984). For a discussion of
Falzon and Club Med, see infra notes 215-43 and accompanying text.
29. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, Volkwagenwerk Aktien-
gesellschaft v. Falzon, 465 U.S. 1014 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Falzon Brief];
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Club Mediterranee, S.A. v. Dorin,
105 S. Ct. 286 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Club Med Brief]. For a discussion of
these briefs, see supra notes 222-26, 231-43 and accompanying text.
30. In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 604 (5th Cir. 1985), petition for cert. filed
sub nom. Anschuetz & Co. v. Mississippi River Bridge Authority, 54 U.S.L.W.
3084 (U.S. July 17, 1985) (no. 85-98); In re Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm
GmbH, 757 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1985), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Messerschmitt
Bolkow Blohm v. Walker, 54 U.S.L.W. 3084 (U.S. July 17, 1985) (No. 85-99).
For a discussion of these two cases, see infra notes 187-211 and accompanying
text.
31. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 9, at 1483-85; Note, supra note 20.
19861 257
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dictional power of the forum State.3 2 A sovereign State may exercise
jurisdiction to prescribe laws and jurisdiction to enforce those laws. 33
International law imposes different restrictions on the jurisdiction of a
State according to whether it is exercising its prescriptive or its enforce-
mentjurisdiction.3 4 Jurisdictional conflicts arise when the same conduct
is subject to jurisdictional assertions by more than one State. 35 Foreign
discovery is subject to the jurisdiction of both the forum State and the
State in which the evidence is located. In resolving this jurisdictional
conflict "[t]he issue is how to harmonize multiple concurrent jurisdic-
tions, not simply how to limit the power of a particular court."'3 6
A. Prescriptive Jurisdiction
Prescriptive jurisdiction refers to a State's jurisdiction to prescribe
rules governing "the activities, relations, or status of persons, or the in-
terests of persons in things, whether by legislation, by executive act or
order, by administrative rule or regulation, or by determination of a
court."' 37 The promulgation of rules governing the taking of evidence is
an exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction.
Historically, the international law of prescriptive jurisdiction was
based on formal criteria derived from principles of territorial sover-
eignty and equality of States.3 8 A State's authority to exercise prescrip-
tive jurisdiction to govern activity was considered absolute and plenary
within its territorial borders, and "susceptible of no limitation not im-
32. ChiefJustice Marshall wrote, "The jurisdiction of courts is a branch of
that which is possessed by the nation as an independent sovereign power."
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 133 (1812).
33. RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 1, §§ 402, 431. For a discussion of
prescriptive jurisdiction, see infra notes 37-49 and accompanying text. For a dis-
cussion of enforcement jurisdiction, see infra notes 50-68 and accompanying
text.
34. RESTATEMENT (REVISED No. 6), supra note 1, § 401 comment a; Onke-
linx, supra note 3, at 489.
35. See Gerber, Beyond Balancing: International Law Restraints on the Reach of
National Laws, 10 YALEJ. INT'L L. 185 (1985). Several States may have the power
to prescribe and enforce rules relating to the same persons, property, and
events. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW or THE UNITED
STATES § 37 (1965). Thus subject to certain limitations, a State is not precluded
by international law from exercising its jurisdiction merely because this would
subject a person to the inconsistent demands of two sovereigns. Id. But cf infra
notes 46-49 (conflicts of jurisdiction are governed by principle of
reasonableness).
36. Oxman, supra note 7, at 744. Professor Oxman states that in jurisdic-
tional conflicts the goal is the "rational ordering of government relationships."
Id. Oxman's analysis formed the basis for the United States' interpretation of the
Evidence Convention in the amicus brief filed in Club Med. See Club Med Brief,
supra note 29, at 7-9. For a discussion of Club Med, see infra notes 227-43 and
accompanying text.
37. RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 1, § 401.
38. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw § 15 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed.
1955).
258 [Vol. 31: p. 253
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posed by itself" (territorial principle).3 9 Additionally, a State had abso-
lute authority to govern its nationals wherever they were found
(nationality principle). 40
However, the strict doctrine of territoriality was gradually diluted,
as States began to assert authority to exercise jurisdiction extraterritori-
ally.4 1 The Lotus case 4 2 represents one of the earliest departures from
the strict doctrine of territoriality. In Lotus, the Permanent Court of In-
ternational Justice stated that there is no general prohibition in interna-
tional law "to the effect that states may not extend application of their
laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts
outside their territory . . . . In these circumstances all that can be re-
quired of a State is that it should not overstep the limits which interna-
tional law places upon its jurisdiction .... -43
Although territoriality and nationality remain the primary bases of
prescriptive jurisdiction, modern technological, economic, and political
developments have resulted in an evolution of international legal princi-
ples of jurisdiction. States now assert the right to regulate conduct
which has or is intended to have a substantial effect within their territory
(effects doctrine).4 4 This expanded concept of prescriptive jurisdiction
inevitably has resulted in increased jurisdictional conflicts and a need for
39. RESTATEMENT (REvISED), supra note 1, § 402(1). See also Schooner Ex-
change v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 133 (1812). In Schooner Exchange,
ChiefJustice Marshall stated, "Any restriction upon [a State's territorial jurisdic-
tion], deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of its
sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of the sovereignty
to the same extent in that power which could impose such a restriction." Id. A
fortiori, one State could not exercise its prescriptive jurisdiction in the territory of
another, i.e., a State's laws could not have extraterritorial effect.
40. RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 1, § 402(2). See also Blackmer v.
United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932) ("The jurisdiction of the United States
over its absent citizen, so far as the binding effect of its legislation is concerned,
is a jurisdiction in personam, as he is personally bound to take notice of the laws
that are applicable to him and to obey them.").
41. Onkelinx, supra note 3, at 490.
42. Case of the S.S. "Lotus," 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A., No. 10, reprinted in 2 J.
HUDSON, WORLD COURT REPORTS 20 (1935) [hereinafter cited as Lotus, 2J. HUD-
SON]. The Lotus case involved a collision on the high seas between a French
vessel (the Lotus) and a Turkish vessel. The Turkish vessel sank and eight Turk-
ish nationals were killed. When the Lotus arrived in a Turkish port, Turkish
authorities arrested a French officer and initiated criminal proceedings against
him. The case was submitted to the International Court of Justice. The sole
issue addressed by the court was whether Turkey had the right to prosecute the
French officer or whether such prosecution would be a violation of international
law. A small majority of the Court held that Turkey had not violated any rule of
international law. See Lotus, 2 J. HUDSON, supra, at 28-29.
43. Lotus, J. HUDSON, supra note 42, at 35.
44. RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 1, § 402(l)(c). See also United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (interpreting
effects doctrine broadly with result of extraterritorial application of United
States antitrust laws to foreign conduct by foreign entities). For a discussion of
the effects doctrine and antitrust law, see D. ROSENTHAL & W. KNIGHTON, NA-
19861 COMMENT 259
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international legal principles to govern their resolution. 4 5 Precisely
what these principles should be remains the subject of controversy. At
the very least, however, conflicts ofjurisdiction are governed by a princi-
ple of reasonableness. 46
The United States uses a balancing of interests approach to deter-
mine whether an exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction is reasonable. 4 7 In
this balancing test, if the exercise of jurisdiction would require a person
to violate the law of another State, the exercise of jurisdiction may be
unreasonable. 4 8 Thus, United States discovery rules that permit or re-
quire a party to violate the internal law of evidence taking in a foreign
State may be considered an unreasonable exercise of prescriptive
jurisdiction. 49
TIONAL LAwS AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE: THE PROBLEM OF EXTRATERRITO-
RIALITY 18 (1982).
45. Gerber, supra note 35, at 185. Gerber suggests that the principle of
non-interference is a central element of any legal framework replacing the doc-
trine of territoriality. Id. at 212. Based on the principle of non-interference, a
State may not exercise its prescriptive jurisdiction with respect to conduct in a
foreign State if to do so "affects essential state interest in such foreign state." Id.
at 213.
46. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 1, § 403(1). The Restatement pro-
vides: "Even when one of the bases for [prescriptive] jurisdiction under § 402 is
present, a state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to the
activities, relations, status, or interests of persons or things having connections
with another state or states when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasona-
ble." Id.
47. The Restatement delineates the following eight factors which are to be
balanced to determine whether an exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable:
(a) the extent to which the activity (i) takes place within the regu-
lating state, or (ii) has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or
in the regulating state;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic
activity, between the regulating state and the persons principally re-
sponsible for the activity to be regulated, or between that state and
those whom the law or regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of
regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regu-
late such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such reg-
ulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence ofjustified expectations that might be protected
or hurt by by the regulation in question;
(e) the importance of regulation to the international political,
legal or economic system;
(f) the extent to which such regulation is consistent with the tra-
ditions of the international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in reg-
ulating the activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by other states.
Id. § 403(2).
48. See id. § 403(3).
49. Id. § 473(1). This section of the Restatement provides, "under interna-
tional law, a state may determine the conditions for taking evidence in its terri-
tory in aid of litigation in another state . I..." d.
[Vol. 31: p. 253
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B. Enforcement Jurisdiction
Enforcement jurisdiction is a State's power "to induce or compel
compliance or punish non-compliance with its laws or regulations,
whether through the courts or by use of . . . non-judicial action."'50
Thus, when a court in one State orders a party to produce evidence that
is located in another State, under the threat of sanctions for noncompli-
ance, it exercises enforcement jurisdiction. 5 ' In ordering the produc-
tion of evidence, although the forum State exercises enforcement
jurisdiction within its own territory, compliance involves doing an act in
the territory of another State. In so extending its enforcement jurisdic-
tion, the forum State comes into conflict with the sovereignty of the
other State.
Since courts cannot accomplish that which the legislature could not,
enforcement jurisdiction exists only to the extent that a State has pre-
scriptive jurisdiction. 52 A valid basis for prescriptive jurisdiction, there-
fore, is a prerequisite for enforcement jurisdiction. 5 3 Enforcement
jurisdiction, however, is not coextensive with, prescriptive jurisdiction.
Under international law, although prescriptive jurisdiction may exist ex-
traterritorially, enforcement jurisdiction "cannot be exercised by a State
outside its territory except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from
international custom or from a convention."' 54 Thus, a State may not
exercise enforcement jurisdiction in the territory of another State with-
out the latter's consent.5 5 The United States recognizes this limitation
on enforcement jurisdiction as a general matter,5 6 but asserts the unilat-
50. Id. § 401(3).
51. Id. § 431 comment b.
52. Id. § 431 comment a. See also Onkelinx, supra note 3, at 496.
53. Onkelinx, supra note 3, at 496. The following are two examples of the
relationship between prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction in the context of
foreign discovery. (1) Assume that a United States court orders either a national
or an alien to produce documents in the United States that are located abroad
but relate to their business activity in the United States, or orders a national to
produce documents located abroad that relate to its business abroad. Since a
State has the authority to regulate business within its territory and the conduct
of its nationals anywhere, there is a valid basis of prescriptive jurisdiction.
(2) Assume that a court orders an alien to produce documents located abroad
and related to its business abroad. The "effects doctrine" is the only valid basis
of prescriptive jurisdiction. However, in the pre-trial stage it has not yet been
established whether an alien's business activities abroad can under any circum-
stances be deemed to have an effect within the United States, i.e., whether pre-
scriptive jurisdiction exists. Absent prescriptive jurisdiction, the court cannot
have jurisdiction to order the discovery abroad.
54. Lotus, 2 J. HUDSON, supra note 42, at 35.
55. See, e.g., Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 133
(1812). The Supreme Court in Schooner Exchange stated that "[a]ll exceptions,
therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within its own territories,
must be traced up to the consent of the national itself. They can flow from no
other legitimate source." Id.
56. RESTATEMENT (REvIsED), supra note 1, § 436.
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eral right to order discovery of information located abroad regardless of
the laws of the foreign state.5
7
United States courts have held that a court may order a party to
produce evidence located abroad provided that the court has jurisdic-
tion over the party and the party has control over the evidence. 58 In this
regard United States courts have failed to recognize that it is not the
power of the court over the party controlling the evidence that is dispos-
itive under rules of international law, but rather the limits of the forum
State's enforcement jurisdiction. 5 9 "The problems of enforcement ju-
risdiction, therefore, [must] be considered exclusively from the point of
view of the international rights of that State in which the enforcement
takes place or is intended to take place."' 60 Because the right to control
enforcement jurisdiction asserted by foreign courts is a State right and
not an individual right,6 1 these rights cannot be the subject of waiver by
individuals subject to the jurisdiction of foreign courts. 62 Implied or
express consent to foreign discovery activity must come from the State
in which discovery is to take place. 6 3
A State's consent to activity within its territory by other States may
be implied. For example, consent to discovery from willing witnesses
may be implied from "patterns of tolerance" that are present in the
United States and to some extent in other common law countries, 64 but
to a lesser extent in civil law countries. 65 A foreign State may not, how-
57. Id. § 437.
58. See, e.g., United States v. First National City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 900-01
(2d Cir. 1968). Even if one accepts that enforcement jurisdiction can exist extra-
territorially, a United States court lacks jurisdictional authority to order foreign
discovery if there is no valid basis of prescriptive jurisdiction, regardless of the
existence of personal jurisdiction. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 1,
§ 431 comment a.
59. See Oxman, supra note 7, at 741. Professor Oxman suggests that the
notion that jurisdiction over the person "domesticates" the party for all pur-
poses relevant to the litigation is fallacious. Id. He further suggests that if par-
ties before a court are subject worldwide to discovery orders, this would have to
be weighed in each case as part of the decision to exercise jurisdiction over the
party. Id.
60. Mann, The Doctrine ofJurisdiction in International Law, 1 REc. DES COURS 1,
147 (1964) (cited in Onkelinx, supra note 3, at 497 n.52).
61. See Falzon Brief, supra note 29, at 7 n.3.
62. See Pierburg GmbH & Co. v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 238,
244-45, 186 Cal. Rptr. 876, 881 (1982).
63. See Oxman, supra note 7, at 751 ("It is established that a state may not
directly invoke its compulsory process against foreign nationals in the territory
of a foreign state without the latter state's consent.") (citing Lotus, 2 J. HUDSON,
supra note 42; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE
UNITED STATES § 8 comments e, f (1965); id. § 20 comment b; id. § 44; RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 53 comment d (1969); G. STUMBERG,
PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 100 (3d ed. 1963); Mann, The Doctrine ofJuris-
dictions in International Law, 111 REC. DES COuRS 1, 128, 138 (1964)).
64. Oxman, supra note 7, at 749.
65. Id. at 753. Presumably this is the result of differences between civil law
262 [Vol. 31: p. 253
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ever, enforce its discovery rules within a State that has an express prohi-
bition in its internal law against such discovery activity. 6 6
A State may expressly consent to activity within its territory through
its domestic legislation, 6 7 bilateral treaties, 68 or multilateral treaties.
The Hague Evidence Convention, the most significant multilateral treaty
on foreign discovery, expresses the consent of the signatory States to
discovery within their territories pursuant to the procedures established
by the Convention.
II. THE HAGUE EVIDENCE CONVENTION
A request for judicial assistance involves the domestic law of both
the requesting State and the State of execution. Absent an international
agreement, the domestic law of the requesting State determines the cir-
cumstances under which a litigant may take procedural steps abroad or
seek judicial assistance. 6 9 The domestic law of the State of execution
governs what evidence gathering activities are permissible, the proce-
dures under which the State will receive requests, and the types of assist-
ance that will be rendered. 70 The Hague Evidence Convention replaces
the principles of comity7 ' with a legal framework to ensure adequate
cooperation in the area ofjudicial assistance between nations with differ-
ent legal policies and procedural laws. 72 In particular, this legal frame-
and common law countries with respect to the gathering of evidence. See infra
notes 74-85 and accompanying text.
66. Oxman, supra note 7, at 750. Absent prohibitions, a party may proceed
with foreign discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. For ex-
ample, a party may take depositions under rule 28(b), which provides: "In a
foreign country, depositions may be taken (1) on notice before a person author-
ized to administer oaths in the place in which the examination is held, either by
the law thereof or by the law of the United States, or (2) before a person com-
missioned by the court .... " FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b). The parties may also submit
interrogatories pursuant to rule 33, or may stipulate, pursuant to rule 29, to any
manner of discovery that they find mutually convenient. FED. R. Civ. P. 29, 33.
67. United States legislation expressly grants broad consent to discovery
activity in the United States in connection with foreign litigation. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1782 (1982).
68. See Oxman, supra note 7, at 53-54. The United States is a party to bilat-
eral agreements in which foreign governments consent, under certain condi-
tions, to examination of willing witnesses by a United States consular officer, or
to specific types of governmental investigations. Id. For a list of these bilateral
agreements, see id. at 753-54 nn.57 & 58.
69. 1 B. RIsTAu, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE (CIVIL AND COMMER-
CIAL) §5-40, AT 253 (1984).
70. Id.
71. For a definition of comity, see supra note 25.
72. See Augustine, Obtaining International Judicial Assistance Under the Federal
Rules and the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters: An Exposition of the Procedures and a Practical Example: In re Westinghouse
Uranium Contract Litigation, 10 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 101, 122-23 (1980);
Comment, supra note 9, at 1465.
In 1938, the American Bar Association adopted a resolution urging "the
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work is designed to provide "a model system to bridge differences
between the common law and civil law approaches to the taking of evi-
dence abroad." 73
Common law and civil law evidence gathering practices have signifi-
cant differences, both substantive and procedural. The common law
practice of pretrial discovery, particularly the liberal pretrial procedures
permitted by United States courts,7 4 is alien to civil law countries. 75
Moreover, in civil law countries the courts do not merely supervise the
gathering of evidence, but perform the primary role in gathering and
presenting evidence. 76 A private party gathering evidence in a civil law
jurisdiction, therefore, may be improperly performing a "public judi-
cial" function and offending the country's "judicial sovereignty. ' 77
Thus, "[i]n drafting the Convention, the doctrine of 'judicial sover-
eignty' had to be constantly borne in mind." 78
Because of these differences in evidence gathering practices and the
lack of established standards for international judicial assistance, courts
and litigants frequently encountered obstacles to obtaining evidence lo-
'Department of State to negotiate with foreign governments, subject to reciproc-
ity, treaties or conventions providing for a more efficient and speedier method
of obtaining evidence abroad for use in legal proceedings pending in this coun-
try.' " Fourth Session of House of Delegates, 24 A.B.A.J. 764, 769 (1938).
73. Letter of the U.S. Department of State submitting the Hague Evidence
Convention to the President of the United States, reprinted in 12 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 324, 324 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Letter of Submittal].
74. Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides a clear
example of liberal United States pretrial discovery practice. The rule permits
discovery of any evidence that "appears reasonably calculated to lead to the dis-
covery of admissible evidence." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
75. See EXTRATERRITORIAL DISCOVERY, supra note 5, at 13. See also Carter,
supra note 8, at 5. Civil law countries frequently express suspicion and hostility
toward United States discovery practices. Id. "Blocking statutes" are a manifes-
tation of this attitude. Id. at 7. For a discussion of blocking statutes, see supra
notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
76. See Carter, supra note 8, at 6-7; Report of the U.S. Delegation, supra note 10,
at 806.
77. Such activity may subject the party to criminal penalties. For example,
article 258 of the French Penal Code imposes a punishment of two to five years
imprisonment for interfering with public, civil, or military functions without law-
ful authority. Borel & Boyd, Opportunities for and Obstacles to Obtaining Evidence in
France for Use in Litigation in the United States, 13 INT'L LAw. 35, 45 (1983). Simi-
larly, article 271 of the Swiss Penal Code provides that anyone who gathers evi-
dence without authorization commits an offense that is punishable by fine or
imprisonment. Frei, Switzerland, Transnational Litigation-Part II: Perspectives from
the U.S. and Abroad, 18 INT'L LAw. 789 (1984).
78. Report of the U.S. Delegation, supra note 10, at 806. By obtainng judicial
assistance through the Hague Evidence Convention procedures, United States
courts defer to the judicial sovereignty of the civil law countries. It is suggested
that it is this deference that provided the quid pro quo for the concessions made
by the civil law countries in the Convention. But see infra notes 244-51 and ac-
companying text (discussing the United States' contrary position).
264 [Vol. 3 1: p. 253
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cated abroad. 79 That evidence which was obtained was often of little, if
any, practical value.8 0 The Hague Evidence Convention, therefore, was
designed to facilitate the gathering of "utilizable" evidence 8 l in a man-
ner that protects the judicial sovereignty of the State in which the evi-
dence is taken.8 2 It mandates certain minimum procedural and
substantive aspects of judicial assistance requests,8 3 permits member
States to provide more liberal assistance procedures,8 4 and makes cer-
tain provisions subject to restrictions by the State of execution. 8 5
The Hague Evidence Convention bridges the gap between common
law and civil law legal systems by codifying three procedures 6 for ob-
taining evidence: letters of request, 8 7 use of consular officials, 88 and use
of private commissioners. 8 9
Letters of request are the primary method of obtaining evidence
under the Convention. Unlike the procedures for the use of consular
officials and commissioners, the procedures for letters of request are
mandatory and not subject to reservations by signatory States. 90 In ad-
dition, the State executing a letter of request is obligated to use the
methods of compulsion set forth under the Convention to the extent
provided by the internal law of the executing State.9 1 Letters of request,
however, may be used only to obtain evidence which is intended for use
in "judicial proceedings, commenced or contemplated. ' 9 2 Article 23 of
79. See Jones, supra note 11, at 516; Letter of Submittal, supra note 73, at 324.
80. Borel & Boyd, supra note 77, at 37 (noting that evidence obtained
abroad often was not in form that was admissible in United States courts).
81. Under the Hague Evidence Convention, the State of execution is obli-
gated to use any special procedure requested unless it is totally "incompatible"
with local procedures or "impossible of performance." Hague Evidence Con-
vention, supra note 9, art. 9.
82. For a discussion of the circumstances under which a State may refuse to
execute a request for judicial assistance, see infra notes 103-07 and accompanying
text.
83. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 9, ch. 1. The provisions of
chapter I dealing with letters of request are mandatory. See id art. 12. Conse-
quently, letters of request are the primary means of obtaining evidence under
the Hague Evidence Convention. This reflects the preference of civil law coun-
tries for this procedure.
84. Id. art. 27. For a discussion of article 27, see infra notes 112-16 and
accompanying text.
85. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 9, art. 33.
86. These procedures are also set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. See FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b).
87. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 9, arts. 1-14.
88. Id. arts. 15-16, 18-22.
89. Id. arts. 17-22.
90. Id. art. 33. Chapter I of the Hague Evidence Convention, which con-
tains the procedures for letters of request, uses the imperative "shall", while
chapter II, which pertains to the use of consuls and commissioners, uses the
permissive "may." Compare, e.g., id art. 9 with id. art. 15.
91. Id. art. 10.
92. Id. art. 1.
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the Convention permits a State to "declare that it will not execute Let-
ters of Request for the purpose of obtaining pretrial discovery of docu-
ments as known in Common Law countries."9 3 Because several
countries initially misunderstood the term "pretrial discovery" to mean
a proceeding permitted prior to commencement of judicial proceed-
ings, 94 many signatory States made declarations pursuant to article 23
prohibiting such discovery. 95
All of the article 23 declarations, with the exception of the United
Kingdom's, were blanket prohibitions against pretrial discovery of docu-
ments.9 6 The United Kingdom's declaration 97 merely refused to exe-
cute letters of request that lacked specificity. 98 At a 1978 meeting of the
Special Commission on the Operation of the Evidence Convention, the
93. Id. art. 23.
94. Report of the U.S. Delegation to the Special Comm'n on the Operation of the
Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (June
1978), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1417, 1421 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Report of the Special Commission Delegation].
95. All of the signatory States, with the exception of Barbados, Cyprus,
Czechoslovakia, Israel, and the United States, have at some point made article
23 declarations prohibiting pretrial discovery of documents. For the text of
these declarations, see 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781 (West Supp. 1985).
96. See id.
97. The United Kingdom declared that it would not execute letters of re-
quest issued for the purpose of obtaining pretrial discovery of documents that
require a person:
(a) to state what documents relevant to the proceedings to which
the Letter of Request relates are, or have been, in his possession, cus-
tody or power; or
(b) to produce any documents other than particular documents
specified in the Letter of Request as being documents appearing to the
requested court to be, or to be likely to be, in his possession, custody or
power.
Id. (United Kingdom declaration 3).
The United Kingdom requested the adoption of article 23. See Augustine,
supra note 72, at 126 n.130. Its request was the result of objections to "fishing
expeditions." For a discussion of States' objections to pretrial discovery, see
supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
98. The Hague Evidence Convention expressly requires a degree of speci-
ficity in letters of request. Under the Convention, a letter of request must
contain:
a) the authority requesting its execution and the authority requested
to execute it, if known to the requesting authority;
b) the names and addresses of the parties to the proceedings and
their representatives, if any;
c) the nature of the proceedings for which the evidence is required,
giving all necessary information in regard thereto;
d) the evidence to be obtained, or the other judicial act to be
performed.
e) Where appropriate, the Letter shall specify, inter alia-the names
and addresses of persons to be examined;
f) the questions to be put to the persons to be examined, or a state-
ment of the subject matter about which they are to be examined;
g) the documents or other property, real or personal, to be inspected;
266 [Vol. 31: p. 253
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American delegate clarified the nature and purpose of pretrial discov-
ery.9 9 In light of this explanation, the delegates from nations that had
issued blanket prohibitions against pretrial discovery agreed to urge
their governments to reconsider their article 23 declarations. 10 0 As a
result, Singapore, Sweden, the Netherlands, Finland, Norway, and Den-
mark modified their declarations to conform to the United King-
dom's. 10 l Italy, Luxemburg, France, Portugal, and West Germany 10 2
retain blanket prohibitions.
Absent an article 23 restriction, a State may only refuse to execute a
letter of request that fails to comply with the formal requirements of the
Convention,10 3 or when execution of the letter "does not fall within the
function of the judiciary," or if the State of execution "considers that its
sovereignty or security would be prejudiced" by executing the re-
quest. 10 4 Refusals to execute letters of request under the Convention
have, in fact, been very infrequent.' 0 5 When a request is refused, article
13 requires the State of execution to notify the requesting State of the
reasons for refusal. 106 The notification requirement protects the re-
questing State against an arbitrary refusal. If a letter of request is im-
properly refused, this would be an appropriate matter for diplomatic
discussions pursuant to article 36.107
h) any requirement that the evidence is to be given on oath or affirma-
tion, and any special form to be used;
i) any special method or procedure to be followed under Article 9.
Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 9, art. 3. Article 3 is modeled after the
United Kingdom bilateral conventions. Report of the U.S. Delegation, supra note
10, at 809.
99. Report of the Special Commission Delegation, supra note 94, at 1423.
100. Id. at 1424.
101. For the text of the revised declarations, see 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781 (West
Supp. 1985).
102. There is some indication that Germany would permit requests which
are within reasonable limits. See Heck, Federal Republic of Germany and the EEC, 18
INT'L LAw. 793, 798 (1984).
103. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 9, art. 5.
104. Id. art. 12. The sovereignty and security exception is taken from arti-
cle 11 of the 1954 Civil Procedure Convention; it also appears in the Hague
Service Convention. Hague Service Convention, supra note 9, art. 13(1). During
the period that the 1954 Convention was in force, this exception was never im-
properly invoked as an excuse to avoid compliance with the Convention and it
was never the basis of a dispute between signatory States. Explanatory Report,
supra note 12, at 335.
105. Report of the Special Commission Delegation, supra note 94, at 1431. See also
Borel & Boyd, supra note 77, at 45. The procedures of the Hague Evidence
Convention are generally unfamiliar to United States attorneys. For example, as
of mid-1978, less than 25 letters of request had been received by the French
Central Authority. Id.
106. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 9, art. 13.
107. Id. art. 36. Article 36 provides that "[a]ny difficulties which may arise
between Contracting States in connection with the operation of this Convention
shall be settled through diplomatic channels." Id.
1986]
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The provisions of the Hague Evidence Convention dealing with the
use of consular officers and commissioners to take evidence are of lim-
ited applicability because of major reservations by the signatory
States.' 0 8 These provisions permit a diplomatic or consular officer to
"take evidence ...without compulsion" from nationals of his or her
own country, or from other persons if "the State in which he exercises
his functions has given its permission."' 109 In addition, a commissioner
"may, without compulsion, take evidence ... [if] the State where the
evidence is to be taken has given its permission."' 10 Application of
measures of compulsion are within the discretion of the State of
execution. 1 1 '
The Hague Evidence Convention also preserves those more liberal
procedures for taking evidence that may exist in the internal law of a
given signatory State. Article 27 of the Convention states:
The provisions of [this] Convention shall not prevent a Con-
tracting State from...
(b) permitting, by internal law or practice, any act pro-
vided for in this Convention to be performed upon less restric-
tive conditions;
(c) permitting, by internal law or practice, methods of
taking evidence other than those provided for in this
Convention. "12
In explaining the purpose of article 27, Phillip Amram, the official Rap-
porteur of the Evidence Convention and co-chair of the drafting com-
mittee, 113 stated that article 27 preserves "for each signatory party all
provisions of its internal law that are more favorable to, and grant more
generous assistance to foreign courts and litigants than the methods
prescribed in the Convention."' "14
108. Augustine, supra note 72, at 131. Article 33 states that "[a] State may
... exclude, in whole or in part, the application of the provisions ... of Chapter
II." Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 9, art. 33.
109. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 9, art. 16.
110. Id. art. 17.
111. Id. art. 18.
112. Id. art. 27.
113. In his capacity as a United States delegate to the Convention, Amram's
comments are particularly significant because "when the meaning of a treaty is
not clear, recourse may be had to the negotiations, preparatory works, and dip-
lomatic correspondence of the contracting parties to establish its meaning." Ar-
izona v. California, 292 U.S. 341, 359-60 (1934). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 147(c)(1), (d) (1965); Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 32, reprinted in 8
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 679 (1969). For an application of principles of treaty
interpretation to the Hague Evidence Convention, see Comment, supra note 9,
at 1475-83.
114. Amram, United States Ratification of Hague Convention on the Taking of Evi-
dence Abroad, 67 AM.J. INT'L L. 104, 107 (1973).
268 [Vol. 3.1: p. 253
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Because article 27 preserves more liberal procedures for obtaining
evidence located abroad, the Hague Evidence Convention made "no
major changes in U.S. procedures" and required "no changes in U.S.
legislation or rules." ' 1 5 Thus, the liberal procedures for judicial assist-
ance provided under United States law 1 6 remain available to litigants
seeking to obtain evidence that is located in the United States.
III. UNITED STATES INTERPRETATION OF THE HAGUE
EVIDENCE CONVENTION
A. Judicial Interpretation
The confusion in United States courts over the proper scope of the
Hague Evidence Convention is dramatically illustrated by three recent
decisions by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.
In Lasky v. Continental Products Corp.,117 a products liability action,
plaintiffs served the German defendant with interrogatories and a re-
quest for the production of documents located in West Germany.1 18
The defendant sought an order requiring the plaintiffs to proceed with
all discovery in accordance with the procedures of Hague Evidence Con-
vention. 119 The defendant argued that, as a foreign national not located
within the United States, it was subject only to the provisions of the
Hague Evidence Convention, and was not subject to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.120 The court acknowledged the general proposition
that the Hague Evidence Convention "supersedes any inconsistent pro-
visions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."' 12 1 Nevertheless, the
court denied the German defendant's request for a protective order on
the grounds that discovery pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure was not inconsistent with the Hague Evidence Convention. 122 The
115. Id. at 105.
116. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1982). See also Letter of Submittal, supra note 73,
at 326 ("ratification of the convention would in no way limit the generous
United States policy ofjudicial assistance set forth in section 1782 of title 28 of
the United States Code").
117. 569 F. Supp. 1227 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (mem.).
118. Id. at 1228.
119. Id. (emphasis added).
120. Id. It appears that the defendant was arguing that discovery must pro-
ceed under the Hague Evidence Convention regardless of where the evidence
was located. Id. at 1228 n. I.
121. Id. This principle of supersession is sometimes referred to as the "last
in time" rule. Under this rule, where a treaty and a federal statute conflict, the
later-enacted will control. Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933); Whitney
v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888). See also RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note
1, § 135; Comment, supra note 9, at 1484. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
have not been amended to expressly modify the Hague Evidence Convention
since its ratification in 1972, and therefore, the Convention controls under the
principle of supersession. Id. at 1483-84.
122. 569 F. Supp. at 1228-29.
1986] COMMENT 269
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court arrived at this conclusion by interpreting article 27 of the Conven-
tion as permitting the use of methods of taking evidence other than
those provided in the Convention,1 2 3 and as preserving the less restric-
tive procedures of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for use by
United States litigants to obtain evidence located in another contracting
State.12 4 Thus, under the Lasky court's interpretation, a United States
litigant has the option to use either the Hague Evidence Convention or
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
In contrast, the court in Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter
Corp. ,125 interpreted article 27 as permitting "only the country in which
the evidence is being sought to supplement unilaterally the convention
procedures with its internal rules."' 126 In Philadelphia Gear the plaintiff
moved to compel the German defendant to answer interrogatories and
produce documents.' 27 Each of the plaintiffs discovery requests re-
quired the production of evidence located in Germany.' 2 8 The defend-
ant objected to the motion on the ground that the plaintiff failed to
comply with the provisions of the Hague Evidence Convention. 12 9 In
holding for defendant, the court disagreed with the Lasky interpretation
of article 27, under which a United States court can use either the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure or Hague Evidence Convention. 130 The
court reasoned that to permit the forum court to replace the Hague Evi-
dence Convention with its own procedures would allow "one sovereign
to foist its legal procedures upon another whose internal rules are dis-
similar."' 13 1 Such a result would defeat what the court recognized as a
central purpose of the Convention to reconcile markedly different dis-
covery procedures between member States.132
Nevertheless, the Philadelphia Gear court rejected an exclusive inter-
pretation of the Convention and held that it was only "the avenue of first
123. Id. The court stated that "[s]ince letters of request are the only
method of compelling the production of evidence under the Hague Convention,
imposing the blanket restriction sought by [the German defendant] would se-
verely restrict the plaintiffs scope of discovery." Id. at 1229.
124. Id. at 1228-29.
125. 100 F.R.D. 58 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (mem.).
126. Id. at 60.
127. Id. at 59.
128. Id. Philadelphia Gear can be distinguished from Lasky. Whereas, in Phil-
adelphia Gear, the defendant objected because the plaintiff did not proceed in
compliance with the Convention; in Lasky, the defendant sought an order requir-
ing that all discovery take place exclusively under the terms of the Convention.
See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
129. 100 F.R.D. at 59.
130. Id. at 60 n.3 (citing Lasky, 569 F. Supp. 1227).
131. Id. at 60. More important, a court order compelling discovery could
be an improper exercise of enforcement jurisdiction. For a discussion of the
limits on a State's enforcement jurisdiction, see supra notes 50-68 and accompa-
nying text.
132. 100 F.R.D. at 59.
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resort."133 In the court's view, if use of the Convention proved futile,
the defendant remained subject to any discovery orders the court might
issue.' 3 4 The court held that initial use of the Convention was required,
not as a treaty obligation, but because principles of comity necessitated
the exercise of judicial restraint when ordering the production of evi-
dence located in a foreign State.' 3 5
In McLaughlin v. Fellows Gear Shaper Co. ,136 yet a third position was
expressed by the Eastern District. The West German corporate defend-
ant objected to plaintiffs' interrogatories and requests for production of
documents on the ground that plaintiff failed to proceed in accordance
with the Hague Evidence Convention.' 3 7 The McLaughlin court rea-
soned that because the Convention deals with discovery procedures car-
ried out in a foreign country, its applicability depends on 1) whether the
information requested may be characterized as "evidence", and
2) whether the "evidence" is found in a foreign territory.' 3 8 The court
stated that the Convention clearly applies to discovery activity in the for-
eign country and that "[a]rguably at least, [it] has no application at all to
the production, in this country, by a party within the jurisdiction of this
court, of evidence pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."' 3 9
The court then observed that United States discovery rules can re-
sult in the production of either evidence or information, and found that
the plaintiffs' second set of interrogatories sought only information.' 40
The court held that the defendant should be required to answer the sec-
ond set of interrogatories, but declined to require compliance with the
first set of interrogatories and the request for production of documents
at that time.141 The court reasoned that those requests might require
activity by persons in Germany "which would be substantially equivalent
to producing evidence in that country." 1 4 2 The court added that the
defendant could be required to comply with other discovery requests
under the Federal Rules, unless it could establish that the Hague Evi-
dence Convention was applicable. 143 The court also observed that
133. Id. at 61.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 60. The court noted that failing to proceed under the Hague
Evidence Convention might be a violation of West Germany's judicial sover-
eignty, in which case the order sought "would run afoul of the interests of sound
international relations and comity." Id.
136. 102 F.R.D. 956 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (mem.).
137. Id. at 958. The defendant relied on Philadelphia Gear and the plaintiffs
relied on Lasky. Id. (citing Philadelphia Gear, 100 F.R.D. 58; Lasky, 569 F. Supp.
1227).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. In the second set of interrogatories the plaintiff sought the identity
and expert witnesses' qualifications. Id.
141. Id. at 959.
142. Id.
143. Id. Regarding defendants' use of the Convention, the court stated that
1986]
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while the Hague Evidence Convention governed the gathering of evi-
dence in West Germany, the Convention was not applicable to the con-
duct of the United States trial; thus, the defendant could be "precluded
from presenting at trial any evidence not adequately disclosed before
trial, and any witness opposing counsel has not had a reasonable oppor-
tunity to depose."' 144
The division of opinion in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania is representative of the divergent views
expressed by courts across the country. The view that principles of com-
ity require use of the Hague Evidence Convention before resorting to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was first expressed in an early state
court decision, Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior Court.14 5 In
Volkswagenwerk, a West German corporate defendant sought to vacate or-
ders of the trial court requiring the defendant to permit inspection of its
German plant, to produce records located in Germany, and to allow
depositions of officers and employees at the plant.' 4 6 Noting that the
trial court and the claimants failed to proceed under either the Hague
Evidence Convention or other procedures "which West Germany had
historically tolerated,"' 14 7 the court concluded that the discovery orders
would violate West German judicial sovereignty. 14 8 The court stated
that, based on either principles of "comity, curtailed discretion, or im-
plied statutory qualification," foreign discovery "must conform to the
channels and procedures established by the host nation."' 149 Neverthe-
less, the court preferred not to interpret the Hague Evidence Conven-
tion "as a presumptive and exclusive rule," but rather as "a minimum
the defendant would have to comply with future discovery requests under the
Federal Rules, unless it could establish that plaintiffs sought evidence located in
Germany, that its production would amount to production of evidence in that
country, and that such evidence will not be offered into evidence or relied upon
by defendant in the course of the proceedings. Id.
144. Id. at 958.
145. 123 Cal. App. 3d 840, 176 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1981).
146. Id. at 848, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 877.
147. Id. at 853, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 882. For a discussion of "patterns of toler-
ance" constituting implied consent to foreign discovery procedures, see supra
notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
148. 123 Cal. App. 3d at 855, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 883. Prior to adoption of
the Hague Evidence Convention, an almost identical case arose in California, in
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d 503, 109
Cal. Rptr. 219 (1973). The same result was reached in that case, but the court
stated that "[a] foreign corporation's amenability to local suit does not signal
automatic subjection of its internal affairs to the courts of the forum, because the
latter have not jurisdiction over persons or property outside their territory." Id.
at 507, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 221. In the 1981 case, the court disagreed with the
1973 decision in this respect, stating that "[o]nce a foreign corporation is prop-
erly subject to a court's jurisdiction, it .. .may with technical propriety be or-
dered to act or refrain from acting, in matters relevant to the lawsuit, at places
outside the state." 123 Cal. App. 3d at 856, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 883-84.
149. 123 Cal. App. 3d at 855, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 883.
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measure of international cooperation." 150 Thus, the court held that the
initial discovery order must comply with "the ascertainable require-
ments of the foreign state."' 15 1 In this case the court found that the
Hague Evidence Convention provided an "obvious and preferable"
means for obtaining evidence from within West Germany.1 52 The court
emphasized, however, that it was not questioning the initial jurisdiction
of the trial court in the case, but rather was holding that the trial court,
as a matter of judicial restraint based on international comity, should
have proceeded under the Hague Evidence Convention.15 3
The rule enunciated in Volkswagenwerk was applied in Pierburg & Co.
v. Superior Court 154 to vacate orders requiring a West German defendant
to answer written interrogatories. 15 5 The plaintiffs argued that the evi-
dence sought, i.e., answers to interrogatories, was located in the United
States. 15 6 Rejecting this argument, the court stated that the "clear ap-
plicability of the Convention" could not be avoided by arguing that the
persons responsible for answering the interrogatories could leave West
Germany and perform the physical act of giving answers in the United
States. 15 7 In addition, the West German defendant had counsel and ex-
pert witnesses located in the United States, prompting plaintiffs to assert
that these persons could answer interrogatories in the United States. 158
In also rejecting this argument, the court reasoned that plaintiffs' sug-
gestion would defeat the effectiveness of the Convention in all discovery
matters other than those involving physical inspection of property
owned by a foreign national in the foreign state. 159
The argument rejected by the Pierburg court was embraced by an-
other court in Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc. 160 Graco was a patent infringe-
ment action against a French corporation and its wholly owned United
150. Id. at 859, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 886.
151. Id. at 858, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 884-85.
152. Id. at 858, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
153. Id. at 859, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 885-86.
154. 137 Cal. App. 3d 238, 186 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
155. Id. at 247-48, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 883.
156. Id. at 245, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 881. The plaintiffs' principal argument
was that the defendant had waived the applicability of the Hague Evidence Con-
vention because it had answered an earlier set of interrogatories. Id. at 240-45,
186 Cal. Rptr. at 877-81. The court rejected this argument, stating that the
Convention protects the interests of sovereign States, not individual litigants,
and therefore "may be waived only by the nation whose judicial sovereignty
would thereby be infringed upon." Id. at 244-45, 186 Cal. Rprt. at 881. See also
supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
157. 137 Cal. App. 3d at 245, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
158. Id.
159. Id. This same argument was raised in Schroeder v. Lufthansa German
Airlines, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,222 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (mem.). In Schroeder, a negli-
gence action, the court adopted the view of the Pierburg court and granted a
protective order, stating that the plaintiff must serve interrogatories to the de-
fendant in accordance with the Hague Evidence Convention. Id. at 17,224.
160. 101 F.R.D. 503 (N.D. 111. 1984) (mem.).
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States subsidiary. The plaintiff brought motions to compel answers to
interrogatories and the production of documents, and for the issuance
of a commission under rule 28(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. 16 1 The defendant objected on several grounds, including an as-
sertion that the plaintiff must proceed in accordance with the Hague
Evidence Convention. 16 2
The Graco court acknowledged that an order compelling discovery
in France by means other than the Hague Evidence Convention "might
well violate the Convention."' 163 Moreover, the court noted that "[i]t is
fair to assume that the availability of the Convention procedures was
intended to discourage, and possibly to preempt" foreign discovery
161. Id. at 506-07. Rule 28(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vides that depositions may be taken in a foreign country before a person com-
missioned by the court, and "a person so commissioned shall have the power by
virtue of his commission to administer any necessary oath and take testimony
.... .FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b). Rule 28(b) further provides that a court shall issue
a commission on notice and application under terms that are just and appropri-
ate. Id.
162. Id. at 517-24. Another crucial objection relied on by the defendant
was that the plaintiffs' discovery requests would subject the defendants to liabil-
ity for violating a French blocking statute. Id. at 509. The French blocking stat-
ute was enacted specifically because the provisions of the Hague Evidence
Convention were being disregarded by United States litigants. Id. at 508. The
defendants relied on article 1-bis of the French blocking statute, which the court
quoted:
Subject to treaties of international agreements and laws and regu-
lations in force, it is forbidden to all persons to ask, research or com-
municate, by writing, orally or under any other form, documents or
information on economical, commercial, industrial, financial or techni-
cal matters leading to establishing proofs for use directly or indirectly
in foreign judicial or administrative proceedings.
Id. at 509 (citing translation attached as exhibit A to Soletanche & Radio, Inc. v.
Brown and Lambrecht Earth Movers, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 269, 273 (N.D. Ill. 1983)
(footnote omitted)). The court held that although parts of plaintiffs' discovery
requests might cause defendants to violate this provision of the French blocking
statute, the defendant was obligated to establish a good faith effort to comply
with plaintiffs discovery requests as fully as possible without violating the stat-
ute. Graco, 101 F.R.D. at 525-27. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied
on a "balancing of interests" comity analysis. Id. at 509-16. The court, how-
ever, made two critical assumptions in reaching this conclusion. First, it as-
sumed that, based on the French blocking statute, a letter of request made
pursuant to the Hague Evidence Convention would not be adequate to allow the
plaintiff the discovery to which it was entitled. Id. at 511. Second, because
"[diocuments and interrogatory answers [could] be turned over [to the plaintiff]
outside of France," the court assumed it was not "regulating activity occurring
primarily in France." Id. at 513.
The French blocking statute has been considered among the most extreme
of such information disclosure statutes, as it imposes an absolute prohibition on
disclosure of a broad range of information relating to French national interests.
See generally April, Blocking Statutes as a Response to Extra-Territorial Application of
Law, in ExTRA-TERRITORIAL APPLICATIONS OF LAwS AND RESPONSES THERETO
223, 226 (C. Olmstead ed. 1984) (describing French blocking statute involved in
Graco).
163. 101 F.R.D. at 517.
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without local judicial assistance or approval. 164 In the Graco court's
view, however, discovery does not take place within a State's borders
merely because information to be produced somewhere else is located
there.165 The court explained that, for example, a foreign State's judi-
cial sovereignty is not threatened if interrogatories are served in the
United States even if the needed information is located in the foreign
State. 166 Similarly, the court noted that if a person residing in a foreign
State is subject to jurisdiction in the United States, then a court may
order that he attend a deposition,16 7 because the foreign state's judicial
sovereignty is not affronted where the person is summoned to give the
deposition outside the foreign State. 168 The court noted that the dis-
covery sought in Graco could take place largely within the United States
and therefore held that the plaintiff was not required to proceed solely
in accordance with the Hague Evidence Convention; however, the court
emphasized that it was"not ordering any proceeding [to] be conducted
within France." 169
In Adidas (Canada) Ltd. v. S. S. Seatrain Bennington,170 another French
litigant sought a protective order against depositions of French employ-
ees and requests for production of documents on the ground that dis-
covery was limited to procedures set forth in the Hague Evidence
Convention.' 7 ' The Court noted that the Convention had been inter-
preted as the exclusive means of obtaining discovery within a signatory
State. 17 2 The court held, however, that the Convention was inapplica-
ble in Adidas because discovery was to take place within the United
164. Id. at 520. The court emphasized, however, that the Convention does
not contain an explicit prohibition against other means of taking evidence. Id.
165. 101 F.R.D. at 521 (citing General Electric v. North Star Int'l, Inc., No.
83 C-0838 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 1984).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. The court noted that its order did not compel the taking of any
depositions, but suggested that "a person to be deposed could avoid the incon-
venience of travel to another country by electing voluntarily to appear before a
commissioner or diplomatic or consular official under Chapter II of the Conven-
tion." Id. at 521 n.24.
169. Id. at 524. The court rejected the idea of first resort to the Conven-
tion, stating that "the greatest insult to the civil law countries' sovereignty would
be for American courts to invoke their judicial aid merely as a first resort, subject
to the eventual override of their rulings under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure." Id. at 523. Notably, this argument appears to support the position that
the signatory States intended the procedures of the Evidence Convention to be
the exclusive means of obtaining foreign discovery.
170. 1984 A.M.C. [American Maritime Cases] 2629 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). Adidas
arose out of consolidated actions involving the loss of a shipment of Adidas
equipment aboard the S.S. Seatrain Bennington. Id.
171. Id. at 2629.
172. Id. at 2630 (citing Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, Volkswa-
genwerk v. Falzon, 465 U.S. 1014 (1984)). For a discussion of Falzon, see infra
notes 215-26 and accompanying text.
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States. 173 The court characterized the acts to be performed on French
soil as "preparatory to the giving of evidence." 1 7 4 Because no adverse
party could enter French territory for discovery, and because no oath
would be administered on French soil, the court concluded that judicial
assistance was not required. 175 The court also rejected the argument
that it should not order the French litigant to comply with the discovery
orders on the ground that compliance would require it to violate the
French blocking statute,176 stating that "[the French litigant's] predica-
ment is apparent rather than real."' 77
The plaintiff in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. British Aerospace, Inc.,178 a
product liability action, sought the production of documents in the pos-
session of the defendant's British affiliate. The defendant failed to re-
spond to the discovery requests relating to the British affiliate, but
initially refrained from seeking a protective order. The defendant defied
the court order to produce the documents, and at the second pretrial
conference sought a protective order based on the Hague Evidence
Convention. 1
79
The court held that the defendant had waived any right to claim
protection under the Convention.18 0 Moreover, the court sated that the
173. 1984 A.M.C. at 2631-32. The French defendant had argued that the
Hague Evidence Convention is applicable to all discovery of a national of a sig-
natory State, regardless of where the evidence is located. Id. at 2632.
The court concluded that it would be unfair to apply the Hague Evidence
Convention in Adidas because to do so would allow the French litigant to obtain
discovery under the Federal Rules, while restricting the United States litigant to
Convention procedures. Id.
174. Id. The court stated that the selection of French employees to give
depositions in the forum State and the selection of documents to produce in the
forum State did not require French judicial participation. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 2633. The court stated that the French blocking statute was not
"to be taken at face value as a blanket criminal prohibition against exporting
evidence for use in foreign tribunals." Id. It concluded that because "French
nationals doing business abroad would be ... unable to redress breaches and
frauds committed against them by suit in foreign courts since they would be
barred from supporting their claims with their documents ... exemptions from
the statute's prohibitions [must be] liberally available upon request." Id. For
the text of the blocking statute, see supra note 162.
177. 1984 A.M.C. at 2634. The court reached this conclusion by examining
the legislative history of the statute and finding that it was not intended to be
enforced against French nationals, but rather "to provide them with tactical
weapons and bargaining chips in foreign courts." Id. at 2633.
178. 102 F.R.D. 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
179. Id. at 918-19. The court ordered the defendant to produce the docu-
ments if they were in its possession or in the possession of its British affiliate. Id.
at 919. The court further ordered that if the documents were not found, de-
fendant was to submit a detailed affidavit to the court explaining the steps taken
to locate the documents and why they could not be found. Id.
180. Id. at 918-19. The Cooper court relied in part on Murphy v.
Reifenhauser KG Maschinenfabrik, 101 F.R.D. 360 (D. Vt. 1984). The Murphy
court, however, did not hold that the defendant had waived its right to raise the
276 [Vol. 31: p. 253
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discovery of documents within the defendant's custody and control' 8 '
was not barred by the fact that the documents were situated in a foreign
country.182 Reasoning that the requested discovery would not infringe
on British sovereignty because it entailed only the production of docu-
ments, not a personal appearance, the court held that the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure allowing such production were an appropriate mech-
anism for discovery.18 3
In In re Anschuetz & Co. 184 and In re Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm
GmbH,18 5 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit re-
cently considered the scope of the Hague Evidence Convention. Certio-
rari petitions are pending before the United States Supreme Court in
both of those cases.
186
Anschuetz is a third-party product liability suit against Anschuetz, a
German corporation. 187 Anschuetz moved for a protective order re-
defense of the Convention. In Murphy, the German corporate defendant sought
a protective order late in the discovery proceedings on the ground that the
plaintiff had to comply with the Hague Evidence Convention. Id. at 361. The
defendant already had answered two sets of interrogatories without raising the
Convention issue. Id. The court held that comity did not require that plaintiff
proceed under the Convention at such a relatively late stage of discovery, and
particularly because, in the court's view, a request for production of documents
under the Convention would be futile since Germany had made an article 23
declaration prohibiting pretrial discovery documents. Id. at 363.
181. 102 F.R.D. at 919. Because the documents sought by plaintiff all re-
lated to planes the defendant worked with every day, the court stated that "it is
inconceivable that defendant would not have access to these documents and the
ability to obtain them for its usual business." Id. at 919-20. For a discussion of
the position of United States courts on their power to order a party subject to
their jurisdiction to produce documents abroad that are in the party's possession
or control, see supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
182. 102 F.R.D. at 920 (citing Marc Rich & Co. v. United States, 707 F.2d
663, 667 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1215 (1983); United States v. First Na-
tional City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 900-01 (2d Cir. 1968)). Although Marc Rich and
First National City Bank involved grand jury investigations rather than civil pro-
ceedings, the Cooper court found them applicable, reasoning that the criminal
nature of a proceeding is merely one factor a court may consider in determining
whether, within the principles of comity, to allow discovery under the Federal
Rules. Id. (citing Murphy v. Reifenhauser KG Maschinenfabrik, 101 F.R.D. 360,
363 (D. Vt. 1984)).
183. Id. The court stated that "[d]efendant cannot be allowed to shield cru-
cial documents from discovery by parties with whom it has dealt in the United
States merely by storing them with its affiliate abroad." Id.
184. 754 F.2d 604 (5th Cir. 1985), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Anschuetz &
Co. v. Mississippi River Bridge Authority, 54 U.S.L.W. 3084 (U.S.July 17, 1985)
(No. 85-98). For a recent case in the Eighth Circuit relying heavily on Anschuetz,
see In re Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, 782 F.2d 120 (8th Cir.
1986).
185. 757 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1985), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Mes-
serschmitt Bolkow Blohm, GmbH v. Walker, 54 U.S.L.W. 3084 (U.S. July 17,
1985) (No. 85-99).
186. See 54 U.S.L.W. 3084 (U.S. July 17, 1985).
187. 754 F.2d at 604.
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garding interrogatories, requests for production of documents, and re-
quests for notices of depositions of witnesses located in Germany.188
However, Anschuetz did not rely on the Hague Evidence Conven-
tion. 189 The United States Magistrate ordered Anschuetz to comply
with the discovery requests, and pursuant to that order, several wit-
nesses were examined in Germany. 190 Subsequently, Anschuetz moved
for a protective order based on the Hague Evidence Convention to stop
further depositions that were scheduled to take place, which motion was
denied. 19 1 Anschuetz petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of man-
damus ordering the district judge to vacate or stay its orders compelling
compliance by Anschuetz with certain of plaintiffs discovery requests on
the ground that the orders violated the Convention. 9 2
Following a review of the relevant case law, the Fifth Circuit stated
that an exclusive interpretation of the Convention "would be exception-
ally adverse to United States' interests" since it would allow foreign
States to determine the extent of discovery in United States courts. 193
The court rejected the reasoning relied upon by Anschuetz, 19 4 and
adopted the views expressed in the Graco,19 5 Adidas,
196 and Cooper 19 7
cases, holding that
the Hague Convention is to be employed with the involuntary
deposition of a party conducted in a foreign country, and with
the production of documents or other evidence gathered from
188. Id. at 605.
189. Id. Anschuetz argued that the requests were overbroad and that the
third-party plaintiff in the case already had been afforded an opportunity to take
depositions in Spain of the Anschuetz personnel, Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. The district judge upheld the magistrate's denial of Anschuetz's
motion, and the court of appeals stayed the magistrate's order pending resolu-
tion of "the alleged conflict between the Hague Convention and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure." Id.
192. Id. at 604.
193. Id. at 614. The court added that "[i]t does not require a Prometheus
to foresee that United States litigants would soon find it impossible to obtain
necessary discovery from foreign based parties." Id.
194. See id. at 606. Anschuetz argued that international comity would be
promoted if discovery proceeded under the Hague Evidence Convention. Id.
(citing Philadelphia Gear, 100 F.R.D. 58; Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines,
18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,222 (N.D. I11. 1983) (mem.); Volkswagenwerk, 123 Cal. App.
3d 840, 176 Cal. Rptr. 874; Pierburg, 137 Cal. App. 3d 238, 186 Cal. Rptr. 876).
For a discussion of Schroeder, see supra note 159. For a discussion of Philadelphia
Gear, Volkswagenwerk and Pierburg, see supra notes 125-32 & 145-59 and accompa-
nying text.
195. 754 F.2d at 610 (citing Graco, 101 F.R.D. at 519). For a discussion of
Graco, see supra notes 160-69 and accompanying text.
196. 754 F.2d at 611 (citing Adidas, 1984 A.M.C. at 2632). For a discussion
of Adidas, see supra notes 170-77 and accompanying text.
197. 754 F.2d at 608 (citing Cooper, 102 F.R.D. 918). For a discussion of
Cooper, see supra notes 178-86 and accompanying text.
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persons or entities in the foreign country who are not subject
to the court's in personam jurisdiction. The Hague Convention
has no application at all to the production of evidence in this
country by a party subject to the jurisdiction of a district court
pursuant to the Federal Rules.' 98
The court acknowledged that in ordering international discovery
principles of comity require the exercise of judicial restraint; however,
the comity analysis was left to the district court on remand. 199 The
court stated that Anschuetz could make documents and witnesses avail-
able in Germany if this would be more convenient. However, if An-
schuetz did not voluntarily produce the evidence in Germany, the
district court could order "the production of documents and the exami-
nation of witnesses in the United States to avoid any infringement upon
German sovereignty."120 0
In re Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm GmbH involved a wrongful death ac-
tion against a German helicopter manufacturer and its wholly owned
United States subsidiary, Messerschmitt. 20 1 The district court ordered
Messerschmitt (a) to produce in the United States documents in its pos-
session and control which were physically located in Germany, and
(b) to produce for depositions in the United States the persons that Mes-
serschmitt intended to call as expert witnesses.2 0 2 Messerschmitt
sought a writ of mandamus ordering the district court to revoke the dis-
covery orders and to require that discovery proceed in accordance with
the Hague Evidence Convention. 20 3
Relying on its decision in Anschuetz, the Fifth Circuit held that "the
Convention does not apply to the discovery sought here because the
proceedings are in a United States court, involve only parties subject to
that court's jurisdiction, and ultimately concern only matters that are to
occur in the court's jurisdiction, not aboard."20 4 In Messerschmitt, the
198. 754 F.2d at 615. The court further stated that "[s]o long as discovery
is sought for the identity and qualifications of witnesses there is not basis to
suggest that supplying this information amounts to obtaining evidence in Ger-
many." Id. This same distinction between evidence and information was recog-
nized by the McLaughlin court. See 102 F.R.D. at 958. For a discussion of the
McLaughlin case, see supra notes 136-44 and accompanying text.
199. 754 F.2d at 614-15. The court stated that if the discovery sought in
Germany became particularly intrusive or was contemplated for persons not
subject to the court's jurisdiction, then the court could order the parties to pro-
ceed with the discovery under the Convention. Id. at 615.
200. Id. The court further stated that the full range of sanctions available
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure remain applicable to anyone within
the court's jurisdiction. Id.
201. 757 F.2d at 730.
202. Id. The expert witnesses were German employees of Messerschmitt
residing in Germany. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 731.
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court chose to perform the comity analysis. The court noted that United
States pretrial discovery procedures are alien to civil law legal systems
and acknowledged Germany's interest in the disclosure of documents
within its territory and owned by its nationals. 20 5 The court weighed
Germany's interest against the interest of United States litigants "in
promptly obtaining the documents and deposition testimony necessary
to prepare for complex litigation in an American court."'20 6
Regarding the production of documents, the court noted that the
order in Messerschmitt required a party within the court's jurisdiction to
produce documents in the United States and did not require any gov-
ernmental action in Germany, any appearance of foreign attorneys in
Germany, or any proceedings in Germany. 20 7 Thus, the court held that
the order appropriately balanced the competing interests. 20 8 With re-
spect to the depositions of expert witnesses, the court held that the dep-
ositions were not governed by the Hague Evidence Convention because
they would be taken in the United States.2 0 9 The court acknowledged
that the order requiring the production of German nationals for deposi-
tions in the United States "might concern Germany."'2 10 However, the
court held that the order, which did not involve procedures on German
soil, was directed to the party-defendant, and could only be enforced by
procedures and sanctions directed to a party to the litigation, did not
implicate considerations of comity.2 11
B. Executive Interpretation
In interpreting an international agreement to determine its effect as
domestic law, "a court in the United States gives great weight to an in-
terpretation by the executive branch."' 2 12 In some cases, the Department
of Justice presents the government's views in a brief amicus curiae.2 13
In both Falzon and Club Med, the Department of justice filed briefs ami-
cus curiae before the United States Supreme Court to express the Gov-
ernment's view on the issue of whether discovery of evidence located in
the territory of a party to the Hague Evidence Convention must proceed
205. Id. at 732. For a discussion of the civil law approach to the gathering
of evidence, see supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
206. 757 F.2d at 732.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. The court noted that the plaintiffs only sought to depose in the
United States the employees that Messerschmitt intended to call as expert wit-
nesses at trial. Id.
210. Id. at 733.
211. Id. The court characterized the orders as a "complement to the meas-
ures for trial preparation expressly sanctioned" by rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure relating to the discovery of facts known and opinions
held by experts. Id.
212. RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 1, § 326(2).
213. Id. § 326 comment c.
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exclusively under the provisions of the Convention. 21 4 The views ex-
pressed in these briefs, however, are inconsistent.
In Volkswagenwerk Aktiengeschellschaft v. Falzon,21 5 a products liability
action against Volkswagen of Germany and its American subsidiary, a
Michigan trial court ordered that depositions be taken of employees at
Volkswagen's plant in Germany; Volkswagen moved to quash the depo-
sitions on the grounds, inter alia, that the procedures violated the Hague
Evidence Convention.2 16 Although the trial court certified its order for
interlocutory appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals denied the applica-
tion "for failure to persuade the Court of the need for immediate appel-
late review."'2 17 Subsequently, the trial court ordered Volkswagen to
produce the employees specified in the earlier order for depositions in
Wolfsburg, Germany. 2 18 The second order provided that failure to
comply would subject Volkswagen to appropriate sanctions. 219 The
Michigan Supreme Court denied Volkswagen's application for leave to
appeal. 2 20 On Volkswagen's appeal, the United States Supreme Court
invited the Solicitor General to express the views of the United
States. 221
In the Solicitor General's brief (Falzon Brief, the United States
noted that, in order to accommodate the differences between civil law
and common law countries, the Hague Evidence Convention "deals
comprehensively with the methods available to United States courts and
litigants" for obtaining evidence abroad. 22 2 The Government added:
The parties to the Convention contemplated that proceedings
not authorized by the Convention would not be permitted.
The Convention accordingly must be interpreted to preclude
an evidence taking proceeding in the territory of a foreign state
party if the Convention does not authorize it and the host coun-
try does not otherwise permit it. 2 2 3
The Government concluded, therefore, that "[t]he orders of the Michi-
gan trial court conflict with the obligations of the United States under
the Evidence Convention. '2 24 The United States took the position,
214. See Falzon Brief, supra note 29; Club Med Brief, supra note 29.
215. Falzon v. Volkswagen Mfg. Corp., 417 Mich. 889 (1983), appeal dis-
missed sub nom. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Falzon, 465 U.S. 1014
(1984).
216. See Falzon Brief, supra note 29, at 2.
217. Id. at 3.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Falzon, 464 U.S. 811 (1983).
222. Falzon Brief, supra note 29, at 5.
223. Id. at 6.
224. Id. at 3. The Government also argued that treaty limits on the taking
of evidence were not rendered inapplicable merely because the Michigan trial
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however, that "[blecause the State Department [would] instruct United
States consular officers in [Germany] not to conduct the ordered deposi-
tions ... no international law violation [would] result.2 25 The Supreme
Court dismissed the appeal.2 26
In Club Mediterranee, S.A. v. Dorin,22 7 a personal injury action, a New
York trial court ordered Club Mediterranee (Club Med) to answer inter-
rogatories served on its United States counsel.22 8 Club Med moved to
strike the interrogatories on the grounds, inter alia, that they violated the
Evidence Convention since the information necessary to answer them
was available only in France,229 and that answering the interrogatories
would violate a French penal law. Viewing the United States as the situs
of discovery, the trial court denied Club Med's motion on the ground
that "the Hague Convention proscribes the taking of evidence ... only
in French Territory."2 30 On appeal to the United States Supreme Court,
the United States again filed an amicus brief.
The Solicitor General's brief for the United States (Club Med Brief)
concluded that "the Evidence Convention is not exclusive and that
therefore the order of the New York trial court does not conflict with
any treaty obligations of the United States under the Convention. '" 23 '
Moreover, the United States suggested that "whether the Evidence Con-
vention's procedures should be employed in the first instance depends
court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant and stated that "[t]he Evi-
dence Convention protects the judicial sovereignty of the country in which evi-
dence is taken, not the interests of the parties to the suit. Accordingly, its
strictures apply regardless of the existence of personal jurisdiction." Id. at 7 n.3.
But see supra note 148 (discussing opposite view taken by California court in
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d 503, 109
Cal. Rptr. 219 (1973)).
225. Falzon Brief, supra note 29, at 3, 11. The Government noted that the
depositions were also not authorized under an exchange of notes that had oc-
curred between the United States and Germany in 1955-1956. Id. at 7-11. It
further suggested that the imposition of sanctions as a result of the failure of the
depositions to take place might also result in a violation of the Hague Evidence
Convention. Id. at 12.
226. 465 U.S. 1014 (1984).
227. Dorin v. Club Mediterranee, S.A., 93 A.D.2d 1007, 462 N.Y.S.2d 524
(1983), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 105 S. Ct. 286 (1984).
228. See Club Med Brief, supra note 29, at 1. The Club Med Brief draws much
of its analysis from an article by Professor Oxman. See supra note 7.
229. Club Med Brief, supra note 29, at 2-3.
230. Id. at 3 (emphasis in original).
231. Id. Under the case by case approach, according to the Government's
position, the determination of whether the Hague Evidence Convention should
be employed is to be made by a balancing of interests. Id. at 10-14. The Gov-
ernment stated, "Thus, where a trial court determines that a conflict between a
foreign blocking statute and state or federal discovery rules cannot be recon-
ciled in a given case other than through resort to the Evidence Convention, the
court, as part of a proper comity analysis, should consider whether to require
the litigants to proceed in conformity with the Convention." Id. at 13 (citing
Oxman, supra note 7, at 779-83).
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on the facts and circumstances of each case."' 23 2 Because the trial court
had not performed the balancing of interests necessary in a comity anal-
ysis, the United States took the position that the case did not provide the
Court with an adequate record on which to decide the issue. 2s 3 The
Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and denied certiorari. 23 4
In rejecting an exclusive interpretation, the United States relied pri-
marily on the argument that the Evidence Convention contains no ex-
press provision for exclusivity and that absent such a provision it is
unreasonable to conclude that it prohibits "a longstanding practice val-
ued by at least some members of the American bar . ..a factor that
could indeed have affected the United States decision to ratify the con-
vention." 23 5 The United States also argued that an exclusive interpreta-
tion "would give foreign signatory states the final say in determining the
extent of extraterritorial discovery," especially in light of the availability
and use of article 23 declarations to prohibit pretrial discovery. 2
36
Apparently aware of the inconsistency with its Falzon Brief,2 37 the
United States attempted to clarify its statement made in that case which
"could be construed to mean that the Convention is exclusive": 238
We note that [our statement in Falzon] was not necessary to our
argument that the trial court's order in Falzon was unlawful.
The trial court in Falzon ordered that employees of a foreign
corporation be deposed in Germany before an American con-
sular officer. Under established principles of both domestic
and international law, however, American courts are precluded
from ordering anyone to participate in discovery proceedings
in the territory of a foreign state absent that state's consent,
wholly independent of the Evidence Convention. Because Ger-
many's consent to such discovery was limited to means author-
ized by the Convention, the court in Falzon could order such
proceedings in Germany only if authorized by the
Convention.23 9
The United States did conclude that to the extent the ordered dis-
232. Id. at 14-15.
233. Id.
234. 105 S. Ct. 286 (1984).
235. Club Med Brief, supra note 29, at 7-8 (quoting Oxman, supra note 7, at
760).
236. Id. at 8. The concern over the article 23 prohibitions against pretrial
discovery of documents may no longer be valid in view of the trend to amend
those declarations. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
237. In Falzon, the Government took the position that the contracting par-
ties intended that proceedings not authorized by the Convention would not be
permitted. See Falzon Brief, supra note 29, at 3. For a discussion of Falzon, see
supra notes 213-222 and accompanying text.
238. Club Med Brief, supra note 29, at 9 n.10.
239. Id. (citation omitted).
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covery conflicted with the French blocking statute, 240 use of the Hague
Evidence Convention was required.2 4 1 This conclusion, however, was
not based on a treaty obligation as in Falzon;24 2 rather, it was based on
principles of comity.
24 3
IV. ANALYSIS
The positions expressed by United States courts that the proce-
dures outlined under the Hague Evidence Convention are "op-
tional,"' 244 or that comity requires their use before resort to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure2 45 are contrary to the views of virtually every
other contracting State. 2 46 United States courts analyze the impact of
the Convention on their power to control the conduct of litigation, but
perform little, if any, analysis based on principles of treaty interpretation
and constitutional law. The court decisions reflect a resistance to what
is perceived to be both a threat to their jurisdictional power,2 47 and con-
trary to the interests of United States litigants. 24 8 The status of the
Hague Evidence Convention as a binding treaty has been compromised
by analyses seeking to justify restriction of its scope and impact.
Applying principles of treaty interpretation and constitutional law,
commentators have concluded that the parties to the Convention in-
tended to preclude evidence taking activities that are neither authorized
by the Convention nor otherwise permitted by the foreign State.24 9 As a
240. For a discussion of the French blocking statute, see supra note 162.
241. Club Med. Brief, supra note 29, at 12.
242. For a discussion of the Government's position in Falzon, see supra
notes 222-26 and accompanying text.
243. Club Med Brief, supra note 29, at 12-13.
244. The Lasky court held that the procedures of the Hague Evidence Con-
vention are optional. For a discussion of Lasky, see supra notes 117-24 and ac-
companying text.
245. This is the position taken by the court in Philadelphia Gear. For a dis-
cussion of Philadelphia Gear, see supra notes 125-32 and accompanying text.
246. See, e.g., Letter from the Ambassador of the Republic of Germany to
Judge Coleman, reprinted in EXTRATERRITORIAL DISCOVERY, supra note 5, at 131-
33. The Ambassador stated:
The Convention, together with the provisions of ratification by the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, establishes the legal framework and proce-
dures for the taking of evidence in Germany for use in civil matters
pending in the United States. The Convention sets forth the only pro-
cedures sanctioned by the German government for the taking of such
evidence.
Id. at 131-32.
247. See, e.g., Graco, 101 F.R.D. at 521-22 (exclusive interpretation of Hague
Evidence Convention could result in "very serious interference with the jurisdic-
tion of the court").
248. See, e.g., Anschuetz, 754 F.2d at 606 (exclusive interpretation of Hague
Evidence Convention "would give foreign litigants an extraordinary advantage
in United States courts").
249. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 9, at 1483-85.
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treaty binding on the United States, ratified subsequent to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Convention supersedes the Federal Rules
under the Supremacy Clause. 2 50 This was the position expressed by the
United States in its amicus brief in Falzon.2 5'
In Club Med,2 5 2 however, the United States took the inconsistent po-
sition that use of Convention procedures is only required when princi-
ples of comity dictate exhaustion of these procedures before resort to
the Federal Rules. 25 3 The Government reasoned that absent an express
provision for exclusivity, it is unreasonable to conclude that the negotia-
tors intended to abolish foreign discovery under the Federal Rules. 25 4
However, "unilateral concessions is not the most probable explanation"
for governments to engage in international treaty negotiations. 25 5
Thus, it would also be unreasonable to conclude that the other con-
tracting States agreed to provide greater judicial assistance to United
States courts2 56 without requiring in return the restrictions they sought
on United States foreign discovery practices. 25 7
The issue is not whether, as a treaty, the Hague Evidence Conven-
tion creates obligations binding upon United States courts. It clearly
does; therefore, resort to principles of comity is unnecessary and inap-
propriate.2 58 Properly framed, the issue is what extraterritorial evi-
dence gathering activity is governed by the Convention. With respect to
activity within its scope, the procedures of the Hague Evidence Conven-
tion are the exclusive mechanism for obtaining foreign discovery. This
comment suggests that the scope of the Hague Evidence Convention
should be interpreted in accordance with international principles of
250. For a discussion of the "last in time rule," see supra note 121 and ac-
companying text.
251. Falzon Brief, supra note 29, at 6. For a discussion of the United States'
position in Falzon, see supra notes 215-26 and accompanying text.
252. For a discussion of Club Med, see supra notes 227-43 and accompany-
ing text.
253. The United States' attempt to reconcile its positions in Falzon and Club
Med was feeble at best. In Falzon, the United States clearly took the position that
the Convention procedures and any more liberal procedures permitted by the
host country were the exclusive means for obtaining discovery in a contracting
State. See supra notes 215-26 and accompanying text. In Club Med, the United
States disregarded the clear statement in Falzon regarding the Convention's ex-
clusivity on the ground that it was unnecessary to the Falzon argument. See supra
text accompanying note 239.
254. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
255. Oxman, supra note 7, at 761.
256. For a discussion of the difficulties United States litigants faced ob-
taining foreign discovery prior to the Convention, see generally Jones, supra
note 11.
257. For a discussion of the hostility of civil law countries toward United
States foreign discovery practices, see supra notes 3-8 and accompanying text.
258. For a discussion of the binding nature of the Convention on United
States courts, see supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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jurisdiction. 2 59
Ordering the production of evidence under the threat of sanctions
for noncompliance is an exercise of enforcement jurisdiction. 260 The
court's power to order discovery depends on its authority to exercise its
enforcement jurisdiction, not its personal jurisdiction over the party
possessing or controlling the evidence. 26 1 If a court lacks the authority
to order the taking of evidence in a foreign State, judicial assistance
from that State is required.
Under traditional principles of international law, a State cannot ex-
ercise its enforcement jurisdiction in a foreign State absent that State's
consent. 262 A contracting State's consent to a foreign court ordering
certain evidence gathering activity within its territory can be express or
implied. 263 The contracting States have expressly consented to the tak-
ing of evidence in their territory under the Convention procedures and
under any more liberal procedures permitted by their internal law. 264 If
a more liberal procedure is permitted, use of the Convention is not re-
quired. Thus the scope of the Convention varies depending upon the
restrictions each contracting State has placed on evidence gathering ac-
tivity within its territory. For example, Germany has stated that deposi-
tions and physical inspections 2 6 5 in Germany cannot take place except
through the procedures of the Hague Evidence Convention. 266 France
prohibits the taking of any evidence located in its territory except as pro-
vided for in treaties or international agreements or other valid French
law.2 6 7 Evidence located in France, therefore, may only be obtained
259. For a discussion of international legal principles governing the juris-
diction of States, see supra notes 32-68 and accompanying text.
260. For a definition of enforcement jurisdiction, see supra note 50 and ac-
companying text.
261. For a discussion of international legal principles governing a State's
authority to exercise enforcement jurisdiction, see supra notes 50-68 and accom-
panying text.
262. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
263. For a discussion of consent to extraterritorial exercise of enforcement
jurisdiction, see supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
264. The more liberal procedures are preserved under article 27 of the
Hague Evidence Convention. For a discussion of article 27, see supra notes 112-
14 and accompanying text.
265. See, e.g., Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior Court, 123
Cal. App. 3d 840, 852, 176 Cal. Rptr. 874, 881-82 (1981). For a discussion of
this case, see supra notes 146-54 and accompanying text.
266. A German commentator has noted, however, that judicial assistance
vis-a-vis a party subject to the foreign court's jurisdiction is not normally re-
quired. "Only the inspection of property located in Germany must be arranged
by means of requests for judicial assistance, since the ordering of such inspec-
tions [in the forum state] . . . would violate German sovereignty." Stuerner,
Judicial Assistance to Common-Law Countries Under the Hague Evidence Convention, in
JURISTENZErrUNG 521 (1981) (translated by B. Ristau for ABA Committee on
Private International Law).
267. For a discussion of the French blocking statute, see supra note 162.
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through use of the Convention procedures.
In the absence of a contracting State's express consent to or prohi-
bition against a more liberal evidence gathering practice, this comment
suggests that a United States court should determine whether it is rea-
sonable to infer that the foreign State has consented to the practice.
Whether a court may reasonably imply consent depends on the nature
of the discovery activity.
Since discovery procedures that involve substantial activity on for-
eign soil are more likely to offend the judicial sovereignty of a con-
tracting State,2 68 courts should not infer consent to such activity.
Courts should require that depositions, the production of documents,
and physical inspections within the territory of the foreign State take
place under the Convention procedures. On the other hand, some long-
standing United States foreign discovery practices involve only minimal
activity on foreign soil (e.g., serving interrogatories). It may be reason-
able to find that a contracting State has impliedly consented to such
activity. 2 69
When a contracting State prohibits more liberal evidence gathering
activities within its territory, the power of courts to order foreign discov-
ery is limited to the procedures of the Hague Evidence Convention.
This limitation on the power of courts is necessary to harmonize the
concurrent jurisdictions of the signatory States.
United States courts express the fear that an exclusive interpreta-
tion of the Hague Evidence Convention would result in a serious inter-
ference with the jurisdiction of United States courts. 270 This fear is
unjustified. First, United States courts overstate their authority to order
foreign discovery.2 7 1 The court's authority is not coextensive with its
268. For example, in Anschuetz, the German government objected to the
court ordering the taking of depositions in Kiel, Germany, as a violation of Ger-
many's judicial sovereignty. Anschuetz, 754 F.2d at 605. For a discussion of An-
schuetz, see supra notes 187-200 and accompanying text.
269. This is an alternative to the approach taken by Professor Oxman. See
Oxman, supra note 7. Oxman concluded that United States negotiators did not
intend to prohibit longstanding United States foreign discovery practices. Id. at
760. He further concluded that requiring a comity analysis before resorting to
discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would furnish the quid pro
quo for the concessions made by the civil law countries. Id. at 761. The ap-
proach suggested by this comment affirms the treaty obligations of the United
States under the Convention, but preserves traditional United States foreign dis-
covery practices where appropriate under international principles governing the
jurisdiction of States.
270. See, e.g., Graco, 101 F.R.D. at 521-22. The Graco court stated that an
exclusive interpretation of the Convention "would amount to a major regulation
of the overall conduct of litigation between nationals of different signatory states
... [and, further, that such an interpretation] would make foreign authorities the
final arbiters of what evidence may be taken from their nationals, even when
those nationals are parties properly within the jurisdiction of an American
court." Id.
271. For a discussion of the United States courts' position on their author-
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personal jurisdiction over the party. 2 72 In the absence of the authority
to order discovery, the court must obtain judicial assistance. Under the
Hague Evidence Convention, foreign States must provide greater judi-
cial assistance than was previously available to United States courts.2 73
Some courts suggest that the obligations of the Convention can be
avoided by ordering the production of the evidence outside the signa-
tory State.2 74 It is submitted that there is no substantive difference be-
tween a court ordering an official to seize evidence located in foreign
State and a court ordering a party over whom it has jurisdiction to pro-
duce such evidence. 275 Because the court lacks the authority to do one,
it lacks the authority to do the other. Certainly, for a United States court
to order the removal of evidence from a foreign State is potentially as
offensive to that State's sovereignty as ordering seizure of evidence
within its territory.
Second, requiring the use of Convention procedures does not de-
prive a court of control over the conduct of the proceedings. If a re-
quest for judicial assistance is denied, the court can impose appropriate
procedural sanctions in the interest of fairness to the parties (e.g., make
findings of fact adverse to the party who has failed to produce evidence,
or exclude a witness that was not produced for deposition prior to
trial) .276
United States courts also conclude that regarding the Hague Evi-
dence Convention as the exclusive procedural construct for foreign dis-
covery would be contrary to the interests of United States litigants.
Generally, this conclusion is based on the assumption that such litigants
often would be unable to obtain discovery under the Convention.2 77
The courts often ignore the fact that the contracting States have as-
sumed a good faith obligation to implement any valid discovery re-
ity to order extraterritorial discovery, see supra notes 58-60 and accompanying
text.
272. For a discussion of the limits of a State's enforcement jurisdiction, see
supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
273. For example, the State executing the request must use appropriate
measures of compulsion. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 9, art. 10. Ar-
ticle 10 states that "the requested authority shall apply the appropriate measures
of compulsion in the instances and to the same extent as are provided by its
internal law for the execution of orders issued by the authorities of its own coun-
try or of requests made by parties in internal proceedings." Id.
274. See, e.g., Graco, 101 F.R.D. at 519-20.
275. Ordering an official to seize evidence in a foreign State would be con-
trary to international law. Onkelinx, supra note 3, at 497 (citing Rosusseau,
L'Independence de l'Etat dam l'Ordre International, 2 REc. DES COUR 171, 224
(1948)).
276. McLaughlin, 102 F.R.D. at 958; RESTATEMENT (REvISED) supra note 1,
§ 437(2)(b).
277. See, e.g., Graco, 101 F.R.D. at 511 ("a Letter of Request would not be
adequate to allow Graco the discovery to which it is entitled").
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quest. 278 They focus instead on such restrictions as the article 23
declarations prohibiting pretrial discovery of documents. 279 However,
only five contracting States have blanket article 23 declarations. The
remaining States only prohibit document requests that lack specific-
ity. 28 0 Moreover, those declarations apply only to documentary evi-
dence, not interrogatories, depositions, or the inspection of property.
Anschuetz28 1 and Messerschmitt,28 2 the two Fifth Circuit cases now
pending before the Supreme Court, are ripe for review2 83 and present
the Court with an opportunity to establish order out of the current
chaos surrounding the proper role of the Hague Evidence Convention.
Moreover, the cases present the issue in the form most commonly en-
countered in United States litigation, i.e., orders to produce in the
United States documents and witnesses located abroad.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has the opportunity to reaffirm that the Hague
Evidence Convention is a treaty obligation of the United States binding
upon its courts. It is suggested that it is in the best interest of the
United States to uphold this obligation, and not to derrogate from it
through resort to principles of comity. The Hague Evidence Conven-
tion is part of an ongoing effort to improve international judicial cooper-
ation and codify private international law. It is in the best interest of the
United States to support this effort, since the alternative is a return to
the pre-Convention days when foreign judicial assistance was even more
difficult to obtain.2 84 The Hague Evidence Convention is not flawless; it
is the product of compromises made in the spirit of international coop-
278. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 9, art. 9. Article 9 states that
a request must be executed unless it "is incompatible with the internal law of the
State of execution or is impossible of performance by reason of its internal prac-
tice and procedure or by reason of practical difficulties." Id.
279. For a discussion of the article 23 declarations by various contracting
states, see supra notes 93-102 and accompanying text.
280. The majority of the less restrictive article 23 declarations were
modeled after that of the United Kingdom. For a discussion of the United King-
dom's declaration, see supra notes 97-98.
281. For a discussion of Anschuetz, see supra notes 187-200 and accompany-
ing text.
282. For a discussion of Messerschmitt, see supra notes 201-11 and accompa-
nying text.
283. It is suggested that no intervention by the Government in Anschuetz or
Messerschmitt will render this issue moot. Moreover, the records are fully devel-
oped; and include an expression of Germany's objection to the discovery or-
dered. In contrast the United States, in Falzon, ordered its consular official not
to conduct the requested depositions in Germany, thus rendering the issue
moot. Falzon Brief, supra note 29, at 3. Also in Club Med, the lower court did not
perform a comity analysis; therefore, the United States concluded that review by
the Court would be inappropriate. Club Med Brief, supra note 29, at 14.
284. For a discussion of the obstacles to obtaining discovery before the
Hague Evidence Convention, see supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
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eration. Compromise and accommodation are essential in a society
where transnational activity is commonplace. As the Supreme Court
stated, "We cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and in-
ternational waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and
resolved in our courts." '28 5
Continued application of principles of comity to circumvent the
Convention will undoubtedly result in more frequent unilateral action,
over foreign States' objections, by United States courts. Such action,
inconsistent with the United States' obligations under the Hague Evi-
dence Convention, can only serve to increase the level of friction and
hostility between the United States and other States signatory to the
treaty. It is precisely that kind of friction and hostility, and the concom-
mitant failure of international judicial cooperation, that the Hague Evi-
dence Convention was designed to prevent.
Recognition that the Hague Evidence Convention is the exclusive
means by which to obtain discovery abroad, on the other hand, would
further the treaty's goals by increasing the level of cooperation between
United States and foreign courts. Increased international cooperation,
in itself a widely accepted policy objective, 28 6 can produce greater mu-
tual understanding by courts and officials of the differences and com-
monalities among various legal systems. Only with increased
understanding of these systems will they develop a resolution of the
problems that still remain in the area of extraterritorial discovery.
Marguerite E. Trossevin *
285. Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972).
286. See, e.g., Furth, Discovery in Aid of Litigation Pending in a Foreign Court, in
EXTRA-TERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF LAwS AND RESPONSES THERETO 179 (C.
Olmstead ed. 1984) (Furth, U.S. Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Anti-
trust, acknowledging that "no one is likely to question the general proposition
that there is a need for international cooperation in the gathering of evidence
for use in international proceedings").
* Ms. Trossevin, a member of Volume 30 of the Villanova Law Review, is
now associated with the Washington, D.C., law firm of Sutherland, Asbill &
Brennan.
290 [Vol. 31: p. 253
38
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [1986], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol31/iss1/4
